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Academics have discussed the dynamics between new entrants and incumbents and the 
complementary assets needed to commercialize a technology. This thesis discusses the 
special situation of de-alio entrants, built on the synthetic framework proposed by Gans-
Stern (2003) and He et al. (2006).  As presented by Gans-Stern (2003), when intellectual 
property protection is poor and incumbents have control over the necessary 
complementary asset, which are assets, infrastructure or capabilities needed to support 
the successful commercialization and marketing of a technological innovation,  the new 
entrants are in a very venerable position. . The assumption of Gan-Stern‟s framework is 
that the entrants are de-novo entrants/ entrants without pre-experience. He et al. (2006) 
made a significant contribution to this stream of literature by highlighting the existence 
and a special situation of de-alio entrants. Equipped with previous industry experience, 
de-alio entrants can adopt different entry strategies, leveraging on complementary assets 
first, and building up intellectual property later. However, we question whether this is the 
only possible entry strategy for de-alio entrants. 
Based on the literature review, we raised the following research questions:  
 Whether there exist different entry strategies for de-alio entrants?  
 What are the possible factors that trigger the different entry strategies adopted by 
different de-alio entrants?  
To address the above research question, we have investigated the digital audio player 
industry, adopting the complementary assets perspective. The digital audio industry 




above. Both the intellectual property and complementary assets are important for digital 
audio player industry. Through secondary data analysis, including archival records, 
documentation and physical artifacts, and patent data analysis, we illustrated how several 
digital audio player firms pursued different entry strategies: leveraging on existing 
complementary assets first, followed by building up intellectual property or vice-versa; 
we then discussed what factors that determine which strategy they choose. We present the 
following conclusions to provide suggestions to academic researchers and industry 
managers in the area of entry strategy management of de-alio firms.  
 There exist two possible entry behaviors: leveraging on existing complementary 
assets first followed by building up intellectual property or vice-versa. Our study 
confirmed the presence of de-alio entrant in a new context. 
 The different entry paths followed by de-alio are contingent on the kind of 
complementary assets they hold: specialized or generic. Specialized assets could 
serve as a source of competitive advantage and allow de-alio entrants to establish 
a foothold on market first. Generic complementary assets could not provide 
significant competitive advantage of de-alio entrants to leverage, compared with 
de-novo entrants. Hence, it is reasonable for them to adopt similar strategy as de-
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1.1 Motivation  
The dynamics of incumbents and new entrants have been studied by many researchers. A 
classic stream of strategic management literature emphasizes that successful incumbents 
hold resources and competences that can be leveraged into other markets or industries 
(Carroll et al., 1996). Another stream of literature emphasizes on entrepreneurs to regale 
the virtues of new organizations. It has been suggested that the complementary assets, 
which are assets, infrastructure or capabilities needed to support the successful 
commercialization and marketing of a technological innovation, are critical in 
determining the performance of incumbents and new entrants (Rothaermel, & Hill, 2005; 
Teece, 1986). However, in reality, there are not obvious and significant differences 
between incumbents and new entrants. Some firms may enter a completely new industry 
because of expansion, management strategic decisions or a technology push. For example, 
in the digital audio player industry, the major players Apple, Creative, SanDisk and 
Microsoft all entered with different industrial backgrounds. Relative to the new industry, 
they are new entrants. This kind of entrants is called a de-alio entrant, an entrant that 
comes from another industry, relative to a de-novo entrant that is an entrepreneur. 
However, they entered this new industry with past experience and they are incumbents 
with experience and resource in their previous industries. The existence and ambiguity 
characteristics of de-alio entrants call our attention and interest to differentiate their 




1.2 Research Objectives 
 In this thesis we explore the strategy of de-alio entrants and the role that generic and 
specialized complementary assets have played in enabling firms to enter the digital audio 
industry. Philips and Sony were the major players before the introduction of the digital 
audio player. They co-developed the compact disk (CD) and established the industry 
standard that led the music industry into the digital era. Both firms reacted aggressively 
to the decline of CD sales and have invested in other areas, but it took a long time for 
them to pursue the next technological trajectory. New entrants from different industrial 
backgrounds, such as Apple, Creative, SanDisk and Microsoft, adopted different 
strategies to enter the digital audio player industry. All the entrants had industrial 
experience before they entered the digital audio player industry and were hence de-alio 
entrants compared to the de-novo entrants with no previous experience. We will discuss 
this from an intellectual property and complementary assets perspective and illustrate the 
different entry strategies adopted by each company from the entrant‟s point of view.  
In order to illustrate the strategies, we present a case study of the digital audio player 
industry. This case study is illustrated from the following perspective: the storage media 
(flash drive based or hard disk drive based), the music management software, the music 
content distribution (online music available for downloading) and the connection (the 
data transfer between PCs and digital audio players). From the early flash drive based 
players to the later hard drive based players, several firms entered this industry from 
different backgrounds and adopted different strategies. Our study uses both a quantitative 
analysis of intellectual property (US patents granted to these firms between 1991 and 




research suggests that some of the de-alio entrants initially relied upon complementary 
assets to enter the market, based on the different type of complementary assets they 
owned, especially when they wanted to enter the market in a short time frame. It also 
reveals other de-alio entrants that began to patent aggressively before entering the market 
and then leveraged on their complementary assets after entering the market. This result 
inspires us to rethink the entry strategy for de-alio entrants, contingent on the 
complementary assets that they hold. We suggest that the different entry strategies 
adopted by de-alio firms should depend on the kind of complementary assets they hold. 
 
1.3 Thesis Structure 
The reminder of this thesis is structured as follows.  
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
This chapter mainly reviews the literature on entry strategy. It covers the dynamics 
between incumbent firms and new entrants, and the reasons why some incumbent firms 
may fail due to the competition from the new entrants.  It is followed by an extensive 
review of Teece (1986) framework on the importance of complementary assets in 
profiting from technological innovation, followed by Gans -Stern (2003)‟s synthetic 
framework to identify the central drivers of start-up commercialization strategy. He et al. 
(2006) proposed an extension of Gans-Stern‟s model by highlighting the existence and 
special situation of de-alio entrant: leveraging on complementary assets first and building 
up intellectual property later. This will lead us to focus on the different entry strategies 





Chapter 3: Research Methodology 
We present the research methodology used in this thesis. This chapter explains the 
reasons why we use the single-case study as our research methodology. It begins with an 
overview of research methodologies, and covers the different classification of research 
methodologies, rationalism versus interpretivism and quantitative versus qualitative. It is 
followed by an extensive discussion about case study: the reasons of using case study, the 
selection of our single case, and the design and structure of our case study.  
 
Chapter 4: Research Context 
This chapter presents the research context of this thesis. We present our focus industry 
and begin with the background of the digital audio player industry. After a historical 
review about the digital audio player industry, we present a summary of the digital audio 
player firms and their first launched product, and then narrow it down into our focus 
firms. We present the reasons why we would like to focus on these firms and the in-depth 
analysis of each firms and their first launched products and the patent analysis in next 
chapter.   
 
Chapter 5 Analysis and Discussion  
In this chapter, we present the analysis and discussion of the data and information we 




review. We analyze the detailed entry behaviors of each firm and their first launched 
products chronologically. This includes the general information about the firm, their 
strategic and management practices, and the detailed information about how they 
launched their first digital audio players. This is then followed by the patent analysis 
based on the data collected from the United States patents and Trademark Office 
(USPTO) website. We analyze and discuss about the different entry strategies adopted by 
our focus firms based on the qualitative information and patent stock analysis. Next, we 
analyze the necessary complementary assets needed to commercialize digital audio player, 
and then we discuss about the possible factors that triggered the different entry strategies 
of our focus firms. The research questions are addressed accordingly in this chapter.  
 
Chapter 6: Findings and conclusion  
In this chapter we summarize our research findings, as well as contributions to the 
literature and management, and implications. Finally we will discuss the limitation of this 
study and how future research it could bring forward.   
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2. Literature Review  
2.1  Introduction 
In order to study the entry strategy of de-alio firms in the context of complementary 
assets, we first conducted a review of the entry strategy literature to give us an overview 
of the research in this area and identify the unsolved problems. The introduction to entry 
strategy begins with the factors that contribute to the failure of some incumbent firms due 
to the competition from new entrants.  
The main sources of our literature are leading technology and management journals, 
which include Administrative Science Quarterly, Journal of Product Innovation 
Management, Management Science, Organization Science, Strategic Management 
Journal, and Research Policy as well as Harvard Business Review. These sources allowed 
us to enrich our understanding of firm entry strategy and form a solid structure to address 
our research questions.  
 
2.2 The Dynamics of Entry Strategy  
Many researchers have studied the dynamics between incumbent firms and new entrants 
and the reasons why some incumbent firms may fail due to competition from new 
entrants. Several factors have been analyzed in the literature. The structural inertia theory 
(Hannan, & Freeman, 1984) proposed a model of the process of organizational change 
that includes both internal and external constraints on organizational change. Competence 




and capabilities of the incumbent obsolete. The subsequent modular and architectural 
innovation (Henderson, & Clark, 1990) further explains why great firms could fail in core 
technological innovations, as these innovations are difficult for established firms to 
manage since their organizational structures are built around particular product 
architecture. Disruptive innovation (Christensen, 2003) distinguishes between "low-end 
disruption", which targets customers who do not need the full performance valued by 
customers at the high end of the market who are the major customers targeted by 
incumbents, and "new-market disruption", which targets customers who have needs that 
were previously unserved by the existing incumbents.  
 
2.3 Complementary Asset Perspective   
Teece (1986) emphasized the importance of complementary assets in profiting from 
technological innovation. A framework was proposed to identify the factors that 
determine who will generate profit from an innovation. It explains why innovative firms 
often fail to profit from an innovation and why profit favors those with the necessary 
complementary assets, especially when imitation is easy.  This framework also argues 
that the commercialization of an innovation requires that the know-how is utilized in 
conjunction with other capabilities or assets. Services such as marketing, competitive 
manufacturing and after sales support are almost always needed. These services are 
obtained from complementary assets that are specialized (Teece, 1986). This framework 
differentiates between three different types of complementary assets: generic 




complementary assets. Generic assets do not need to be tailored to the innovation and can 
be easily contracted or acquired from the market, such as manufacturing facilities for 
making running shoes. Specialized assets hold unilateral dependence between the 
innovation and the complementary assets, such as the specific repair facilities that are 
needed to introduce the rotary engine. Co-specialized assets are characterized by a 
bilateral dependence, such as the containerization that is required for the deployment of 
some co-specialized assets in ocean shipping and terminals. This framework also 
emphasizes the importance of cooperation between the innovator and the incumbents. 
Rather than competing head-on, cooperation is likely to be an optimal strategy when the 
appropriability regime is tight and the complementary assets are available in competitive 
supply.  
Gans-Stern (2003) presented a synthetic framework to identify the central drivers of start-
up commercialization strategy: the product market versus the market for ideas. A product 
market strategy requires the innovators to offer an integrated value proposition and 
avoids the fight back from incumbents. An alternative to competing head-on is a 
cooperation strategy, meaning that the innovators make profit on innovation through the 
market for ideas. Both the product market strategy and the market for ideas involve 
benefits and risks. The Gans–Stern (2003) model, as shown in Figure 2.1, shows that the 
commercialization strategy results from the interaction between two crucial elements of 
the commercialization environment: the excludability environment (which is shown on 
the vertical axis) and the complementary asset environment (which is shown on the 
horizontal axis).  When there is strong appropriability and the incumbent controls the 




commercialize through partnerships with downstream players (the “ideas factory” as 
shown in Figure 2.1).  When there is strong appropriability and the incumbents do not 
have control over the necessary complementary assets, entrants can compete head-on (the 
“greenfield competition” as shown in Figure 2.1). When intellectual property protection 
is poor and the incumbents do not control the necessary complementary assets, the 
entrants and incumbents face off on a level playing field. In order to capture market 
leadership, entrants should effectively develop and diffuse competence-destroying 
technology (the “attacker‟s advantage” as shown in Figure 2.1). In the last quadrant, 
intellectual property protection is poor and the incumbents have control over the 
necessary complementary assets. Hence, the entrants are in a very venerable position. In 
this kind of situation, the incumbents have an incentive to invest and re-engineer the 
innovator‟s idea because they are in a more advantageous position to profit from the 
innovation compared to entrants. Cooperation is rare except when incumbents choose a 











Figure 2.1: Gans& Stern (2003) Model 
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He et al. (2006) proposed an extension of Gans-Stern‟s model that argues that 
opportunities still exist for entrants in a “reputation-based ideas trading” situation, where 
the appropriability regime is weak and the incumbents control the necessary 
complementary assets. An assumption of Gans-Stern‟s framework is that the entrants are 
de-novo, meaning they entered the industry with technological innovation with few 
complementary assets.  In He et al (2006)‟s framework, as shown in Figure 2.2, they 
added the special case of de-alio entrants, or entry by existing firms. In the mobile 
telecommunication industry as illustrated in their work, the de-alio entrants (such as 




assets (He et al., 2006). After establishing an initial market foothold, the entrants could 




Figure 2.2 : He et al (2006) extension of Gans-Stern (2003) Model 
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2.4 Research Questions  
After we reviewed the literature about the dynamics between incumbents and new 
entrants as well as the literature about complementary assets, we have gained the 
understanding of entry strategies. He et al. (2006) made a significant contribution to this 
stream of literature by highlighting the existence and special situation of de-alio entrants. 
Equipped with previous industry experience, de-alio entrants can adopt different entry 
strategies, leveraging on complementary assets first and building up intellectual property 
later. However, we question whether this is the only possible entry strategy for de-alio 
entrants. Our research is motivated by the possible existence of different entry strategies 
for de-alio entrants and, if different entry strategies do exist, what factors determine the 
strategy that a de-alio entrant adopts. Our investigation of the digital audio player 
industry reveals two different entry strategies used by de-alio entrants. Some of the de-
alio firms initially relied upon their existing complementary assets to enter the market, 
especially when they wanted to enter the market in a short time frame. However, there 
were also firms that began to patent aggressively before entering the market and only 
leveraged on their complementary assets after entering the market. Hence, we intend to 
contribute to this stream of literature by showing how de-alio entrants can adopt two 
different paths of entry, depending on their complementary assets. In this thesis, we 
discuss the entry strategies on the focus of de-alio entrants, as illustrated previously. The 
two different entry paths emerged from our observation of digital audio player case and 
generalization of the findings warrants careful consideration.Thus, as shown in Figure 2.3, 




can be bi-directional, contingent on the kind of complementary assets they hold. Based 
on the discussion above, our research questions are phrased as below: 
 Whether there exist different entry strategies for de-alio entrants?  
 What are the possible factors that trigger the different entry strategies adopted by 
different de-alio entrants?  
We try to address these questions from the de-alio entrants‟ point of view in the context 
of complementary assets.  
Figure 2.3 Bidirectional Entry Paths when Entrant is de-alio 
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3.  Research Methodologies 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we explain the research methodology used in our research. This chapter 
explains the reasons why we use the single-case study as our research methodology. We 
begin this chapter with an overview of research methodologies, and covers the different 
classification of research methodologies both rationalism versus interpretivism and 
quantitative versus qualitative. It is followed by an extensive discussion about case study: 
the reasons of using case study in our research, the selection of case, and the design and 
structure of the case study. We will end this chapter with a brief illustration about the 
data collection of this case study.  
 
3.2 Classification of Research Methodologies 
There are different classifications of research methodologies. Research method is 
characterized by the techniques we used when collecting and analyzing data and 
information. The choice of which methodology to use is dependent on the nature of the 
proposed research questions. Morgan and Smircich (1980) argue that the actual suitability 
of a research method derives from the nature of the social phenomena to be explored.  
3.2.1 Rationalism versus Interpretivism 
One kind of classification could be rationalism and interpretivism. Generally, rationalism 
uses quantitative methodologies to describe or explain phenomena. The methodologies 




experiments. Rationalism is concerned with explaining what happens and how, so as to 
achieve some goal or end such as predicting production system characteristics, or perhaps 
the effect of some change in managerial policy on plant measures (Meredith, 1998).  
Case/field study takes another approach which is known as interpretivism. A case study 
typically uses multiple methods and tools for data collection from a number of entities by 
direct observers in a single, natural setting that considers temporal and contextual aspects 
of the contemporary phenomenon under study, but without experimental controls or 
manipulations (Meredith, 1998). The goal of this approach is to understand as fully as 
possible the phenomenon being studied through „perceptual triangulation‟ (Bonoma, 
1985).  
Both rationalist and case researches have strengths and weaknesses. The strengths of 
rationalist include precision, testability and reliability, which are achievable by carefully 
specifying and precisely testing the quantitative variables, and there is wide acceptance of 
the standard research approach of rationalist. However, at the same time, there will be 
problem of sampling, choice of models, and restriction of variables.  
For case study approach the strengths could be discussed from three perspectives 
(Meredith, 1998; Benbasat et al., 1987):  
 Study the phenomenon in its natural setting and meaningful, relevant theory 
generated from the understanding gained through observing actual practice; 
 Allow question of why, rather than just what and how, to be answered with a 





 Lead to early, exploratory investigations where the variables are still unknown 
and the phenomenon not at all understood. 
The weaknesses of case study approach come from the requirement of direct observation 
and time.  At the same time, case research lacks of controls and familiarity of its 
procedures.   
The advantages and disadvantages of rationalist and case research methods are 
summarized in Table 3.1.  
 
Table 3.1: Advantages and Disadvantages of rationalist and case research methods 
  Advantages  Disadvantages  
Rationalist  
Precision Sampling difficulties  
Reliability Trivial data 
Standard procedures Model-limited 
Testability Low explained variance 
 
Variable restrictions 
  Thin Results 
Case 













3.2.2 Single-case versus Multiple-case Study 
The decision to include one or multiple-cases in the research is of significant importance 
to the case study design. According to the suggestion by Yin, single-case study is 
appropriate if it fulfills the following requirements (Yin, 2002; Benbasat et al., 1987): 
 It is a revelatory case, such as it is a situation which was not accessible to 
scientific investigation previously.  
 It represents a critical case for testing a well-formulated theory. According to Yin 
(2003), “To confirm, challenge or extend a theory, there may exist a single-case, 
meeting all the conditions for testing the theory” 
 It is an extreme or unique case.  
Multiple-case study is appropriate when there is some knowledge about the phenomenon 
but much are still unknown (Meredith, 1998). Researcher could use multiple-case study 
to follow up if there is a single-case used for exploration. 
 
3.3 Reasons of using Single-Case Study  
Case study research can be defined as “ a research strategy which focuses on 
understanding the dynamics present within single settings. ” (Eisenhardt,1989). 
According to this definition, case study research is said to be mainly suitable for research 
seeking to answer the “how” and “why” questions (Yin, 2002).  
Case study is often of a qualitative nature, which include a limited number of cases. The 




investigated in depth. The methodologies and tools used in case study include both 
quantitative and qualitative approaches. It could include various sources, such as 
financial data, interviews, memoranda, business plans, organization charts, tools and 
other physical artifacts, questionnaires, and observations of managerial or employee 
actions and interactions (Meredith, 1998). Case study research can be differentiated in to 
several types: exploratory, explanatory, and descriptive case studies (Yin, 2002).  Each of 
these types can either study single or multiple-cases.  
For our research study of digital audio player industry, the reasons for choosing a single-
case study design for the study at hand are the following: 
Firstly, the research method is decided by the nature of research questions. Case study is 
mainly suitable for research seeking to answer the “how” and “why” questions (Yin, 
2002). As described in the previous chapter, this thesis explores the entry strategies of de-
alio firms and why they adopted the specific entry strategies. In this research, we would 
like to explore if there exists the different entry behaviors. According to Yin (2003), “To 
confirm, challenge or extend a theory, there may exist a single-case, meeting all the 
conditions for testing the theory”. These reasons are why we have adopted a single-case 
study.  
Second, the nature of phenomenon dictates the research method and case studies allow 
for a holistic study of a phenomenon (Yin, 2002). At the same time, case study could 
provide a wide range of data collection to evaluate the events or behaviors. In this 




could not control the event behaviors in advance. Hence, we need an open minded case 
study research design.  
In conclusion, a single-case study is the most suitable research methodology to fulfill our 
research objective and also fulfill the requirements of data collection. In addition, instead 
of studying digital audio player in our research, we will also cover the predecessors of 
digital audio players to provide better understanding of this industry.  
 
3.4 Case Study Protocol of Digital Audio Player Industry 
3.4.1 Selection of Suitable Case  
Given our research objective of determining whether different entry strategies exist for 
de-alio entrants and what factors determine which strategy they choose, it is essential to 
identify an industry that contains successful de-alio entrant and de-alio entrant that 
adopted different entry strategies. In the industry we selected, some de-alio firms initially 
relied upon their existing complementary assets and some patented before entering the 
market then leveraged on their complementary assets later.  
The digital audio industry presents an interesting case of entry behaviors consistent with 
the approaches described above. Both intellectual property and complementary assets are 
important for the digital audio player industry. Patent disputes between Apple and 
Creative regarding the user interface for portable media players in 2006 emphasized the 
importance of intellectual property to the market participants. Complementary assets of 




music management software, storage media, data transfer and music content distribution.  
Most of the entrants are de-alio, i.e. they entered the digital audio player industry with 
previous industry experience, such as Microsoft, Sony, Apple, SanDisk and Creative. 
Based on our observations, these firms adopted one of two different entry strategies: 
leveraging on existing complementary assets first then building up intellectual property 
or vice-versa.  
3.4.2 Data Collection Methods 
We conducted the data collection directly after the literature review. Due to the nascent 
nature of MP3 innovation, there is little well documented information available. Hence, 
we have focused our efforts on public sources such as the internet and company websites. 
We have followed the sources of evidence that were identified by Yin (2002). 
 Archival Records: We collected and organized information for the major 
developments and product data for the major firms through the archived 
information in company finance statements and annual reports. After that, we 
presented them in a historical way. 
 Documentation. Our data came from diverse public sources such as Google 
search, Wikipedia, academic journals, company finance statements and annual 
reports, digital audio player websites and business newspapers. We have also 
collected information from technical and marketing research reports from 
professional market research organizations.  
 Physical artifacts. We observed the product information in Singapore electronic 




Usually case studies are categorized as qualitative research. According to Eisenhardt 
(1989) and Yin (2003), case study evidence does not necessarily need to originate from 
purely qualitative data. In order to analyze a firm‟s performance in intellectual property, 
we collected patent information from the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). Our 
dataset consists of US patents issued between 1991 and 2009 to the following companies 
mentioned in the Focus Firms section: Samsung, Microsoft, Sony, Apple, SanDisk and 
Creative.  We chose USPTO patent data for two reasons. First, the US is the largest and 
most competitive digital audio player market in the world. Thus, it is imperative that 
firms competing in this market obtain US patent protection for all their key inventions. 
Second, the USPTO has the largest collection of patents in the world, with extensive 
coverage of digital audio player technology. As such, US patent data is one of the best 
available measures of innovation output for this technology and one that is reasonably 





Table 3.2 Data Source 
Data Sources 
History of MP3 
development  
Wikipedia,  About.com,  Fraunhofer 
Website 
Digital Audio Player 
Information 
CNET Review, Amazon.com, 
Nothingbutcreative.blogspot.com, 
Anythingbutipod, Mp3.com, DAP 
Review, mp3newswire.net 
Technological Trend 
USPTO patents from 1991 to 2009, MP3 
Licensing.com, 
Company Information 
Company Official Website,  Open 
Innovation Blogspot, Inside Steve's Brain, 




In conclusion, we have reviewed the different research methodologies and especially the 
case study research. We presented the advantage and disadvantage of the methodologies. 
Next, we explained the reasons why we use single-case study in this research study. 
Finally, we illustrated the research design of this case study to guide the data collection. 
In the next section, we will begin with the illustration of our single case study first, 
including the history, the focus industry and focus firms we intend to present in our 






4. Research Context   
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents and analyzes the research context of the single case in this thesis. 
This research context serves as background information of our selected single case, 
followed by data analysis and discussion in the next section.  
As presented in last section, our data and information is based on previous literature and 
the practical data we have collected from multiple sources. In the research context, we 
present our focus industry and begin with the background of the digital audio player 
industry. After a historical review about the digital audio player industry, we present a 
summary of the digital audio player firms and their first launched product, and then 
narrow it down into our focus firms. We present the reasons why we would like to focus 
on these firms and present the detailed analysis of each firms and their first launched 
products and the patent analysis in next chapter.   
 
4.2 Focus Industry 
As identified in literature review, our research objectives are to determine 
 Whether different entry strategies exist for de-alio entrants and  




We have selected the digital audio player industry as our single case study in previous 
chapter.  In the remaining section of focus industry, we will discuss about the digital 
audio player industry in detail.  
 
4.2.1 The Pre-Mp3 Story: Philips and Sony 
Before the introduction of digital audio player, Sony and Philips were the major players 
in the music industry. Figure 4.1 presents the technological trajectory and evolution of 
different audio standards. As shown in Figure 4.1, audio standards have gone through 
several stages: compact cassettes, Compact Disc, MiniDiscs/digital compact cassettes and 
then MP3. Philips and Sony were the major players before the introduction of the MP3 
standard. Philips developed the tape standard which established the industry standard for 
music content storage and playback. In 1986, Sony and Philips co-developed and 
introduced the compact disk (CD) standard. Although the CD brought the music industry 
into the digital era, due to the “skipping” issue with portable CD players both Philips and 
Sony experienced the decline of CD sales.  
To address this problem, Philips introduced the digital compact cassette (shown as “DCC” 
in Figure 4.1) standard in 1992. As the successor of the analog cassette tape, DCC players 
could play and record both analog and digital tapes. However, due to a poor sales record, 
Philips ended DCC production in 1996. For a long time Philips‟ effort was still focused 
on superseding its success story of the CD. In 1999, Philips launched the Super Audio 
CD (SACD) in partnership with Sony, but again the SACD did not achieve the same 




by the mainstream market (Guttenberg, 2009; Fleischmann, 2004). In 2006, it introduced 
the Blu-Ray Disc in partnership with Sony
1
.  With all its focus on the disk trajectory, 
Philips did not introduce a digital audio player until the very late stage. We will not focus 
on Philips in our discussion as its focus and competence was on the physical format of 
“disk” instead of a digital format.  
As shown in Figure 4.1, in 1992, the same year that Philips introduced the DCC, Sony 
introduced the MiniDisc (MD) to address declining CD sales. Sony‟s intention was to 
develop a recording and playback device that used a disc smaller than the CD to replace 
the audio compact cassette  (Sony). Sony developed its own codec technology, Adaptive 
Transform Acoustic Coding (ATRAC)
2
, to implement the MD technology. Although the 
MD was not compatible with tapes or CDs, it provided a good performance which 
outweighed its incompatibility disadvantage and it defeated Philips as the first generation 
of digital music player standard after the CD (Kim, & Nam, 2004).   
In the 1990s, while Philips and Sony were working on their own technology trajectories 
as shown in Figure 4.2, the MP3 emerged as an open-standard compressed digital audio 
file format. MPEG-1 Audio Layer 3, commonly known as MP3, is a digital audio 
encoding format that uses a form of data compression with the ability to compress an 
audio file to one tenth of its original size while maintaining near CD audio quality. 
 
                                                 
1
 Blu-ray Disc (official abbreviation BD) is a high definition media format designed to supersede the DVD 
format. 
2
Adaptive Transform Acoustic Coding (ATRAC) is a family of proprietary audio compression algorithms 
developed by Sony. MiniDisc was the first commercial product to incorporate ATRAC in 1992. ATRAC 
allowed a relatively small disc like MiniDisc to have the same running time as CD while storing audio 
information with minimal loss in perceptible quality. Other MiniDisc manufacturers such as Sharp and 








Figure 4.1 The evolution of different audio standards 
 
 
(Source: Modified on Peng, Y.N. (2006). The Influence of Major Pioneering Product 
Innovations and Technological Trajectories in High Technology Markets: Lessons from 
the Personal Computer and Digital Music Industries)  
 
4.2.2 MP3 History 
Table 4.1 presents a brief history of MP3 standard development and we will illustrate it in 




Germany developed the first digital signal processor capable of audio compression. 
Karlheinz Brandenburg, a student of Prof. Seitzer, developed and enhanced the basic 
principles for perceptual audio coding exploiting the hearing properties of the human ear 
as described in psychoacoustics. In 1987, an alliance was formed between Erlangen-
Nuremberg University (headed by Prof. Seitzer) and the Fraunhofer Institute (headed by 
Karlheinz Brandenburg) to carry out research work financed by the European Union as 
part of the EUREKA research program. Incorporating contributions by Hannover 
University, AT&T and Thomson, Fraunhofer IIS developed a powerful audio coding 
algorithm and the Moving Picture Experts Group (MPEG) adopted it as ISO-MPEG 
audio Layer -3 (MP3). The first MPEG subgroup - Audio group was formed by several 
teams of engineers at the Fraunhofer IIS, University of Hannover, AT&T-Bell Labs, 
Thomson-Brandt, CCETT and others. In 1989 Fraunhofer IIS received a patent for MP3: 
United States Patent 5,579,430 (Grill et al., ) for a "digital encoding process"
3
. Later in 
1992, MP3 was included in the MPEG-2 standard. Since 1998 Fraunhofer has enforced 
their patent rights and all developers of MP3 encoders or rippers and decoders/players 
must pay a licensing fee to Fraunhofer.   
The use of a compression algorithm in MP3 is designed to greatly reduce the amount of 
data required to represent the audio recording and still sound like a faithful reproduction 
of the original uncompressed audio to most listeners. An MP3 created using the setting of 
128 kbit/s will result in a file that is about 11 times smaller than the CD file created from 
the original audio source.  
                                                 
3
 US Patent 5,579,430: A digital encoding process for transmitting and/or storing acoustical signs and, in 
particular, music signals. The Assignee is Fraunhofer Gesellschaft zur Foerderung der angewandten 




After the establishment of the MP3 standard, there were several improvements on its 
performance, such as high-speed PCs, high capacity hard disks and high-speed Internet 
modems (Peng, 2006). These improvements greatly lifted the MP3 penetration rate and it 
began to erode the CD market, especially after the introduction of portable digital audio 
players in 1999. Between 2000 and 2008, CD sales dropped in 7 of the 8 years, and in 
2008, large label CD sales dropped by 20% (Smith, 2009). The portable digital audio 
player (usually referred to as an MP3 player) was a significant improvement of the MP3 
innovation.  A digital audio player is a portable consumer electronics device that stores, 
organizes and plays audio files   . The common features of digital audio players are a 
memory storage device, an embedded processor and an audio codec microchip to convert 
compressed sound into a playable format. Depending on the storage media, they can be 




Table 4.1 History of MP3 
Timeline - History of MP3 
Year MP3 Milestones 
1979 
Prof. Dieter Seitzer of Erlangen-Nuremberg University in Germany developed a 
first digital signal processor capable of audio compression. Prof. Seitzer, Karlheinz 
Brandenburg, developed and enhanced basic principles for perceptual audio coding 
exploiting the hearing properties of the human ear as described in psychoacoustics.  
1987 
An alliance was formed between Erlangen-Nuremberg University and the 
Fraunhofer Institute to carry out research work financed by the European Union as 
part of the EUREKA research program [2]. Led by Prof Heinz Gerhaeuser from 
Fraunhofer Institute, the project team invented a working real-time hardware system 
using multiple Digital Signal Processors (DSPs) with audio and data I/O interface 
cards. 
1988 
 Moving Picture Experts Group or MPEG was established as a subcommittee of the 
International Standards Organization/International Electrotechnical Commission or 
ISO/IEC, to develop a digital coding standard for video and audio interactive 
communication. 
1989 
A total of 14 audio compression algorithms were proposed and regrouped according 
to their similarity. Four coding concepts MUSICAM, ASPEC, ATAC and 
SB/ADPCM emerged. After thorough evaluations, MUSICAM and ASPEC 
emerged to be the two most suitable concepts for further exploration. Thomson, 
Fraunhofer, France Telecom and Philips were the key players in proposing the 






Table 4.1 History of MP3 (Continue)  
 
Timeline - History of MP3 
Year MP3 Milestones 
1991 
MUSICAM and ASPEC algorithms were further combined as one for the reasons 
that both have their own superiority. The merging created a family of three coding 
schemes. Layer 1 was a low complexity variant of MUSICAM, Layer 2 was an 
optimized version of MUSICAM and Layer 3 was mainly based on ASPEC. 
1992 
 Fraunhofer's and Dieter Seitzer‟s audio coding algorithm was integrated into the 
first compression technique MPEG-1 for the use in Video CD by the MPEG group 
and ISO tasked group.  
1993  MPEG-1 standard published. 
1994  MPEG-2 developed and published a year later. 
1995 
The established compression algorithm was named as MP3. MPEG Layer 3 was 
selected as the audio format for the WorldSpace satellite digital broadcasting 
system. 
1996 United States patent issued for MP3:United States Patent 5,579,430  
1998 
Fraunhofer started to enforce their patent rights. All developers of MP3 encoders or 
rippers and decoders/players now have to pay a licensing fee to Fraunhofer. 







4.3 Focus Firm  
After analyzing the focus industry of digital audio player industry, we would like to 
narrow it down to the focus firms that adopted the entry strategies: leveraging on existing 
complementary assets first followed by building up intellectual property or vice-versa. 
Pioneers were not very successful commercially for a long time. MPMan, the first mass 
produced player in 1998, was no longer owned by SaeHan Information. Rio brand, which 
was introduced by Diamond Multimedia in 1999, was sold for several times, and the last 
holder was also bankrupted in 2003. HanGo, which cooperated with Compaq to develop 
the first hard drive based player, also quitted the digital audio player industry in 2003. 
These pioneers all adopted the strategy of product market, and they quitted this industry 
soon as shown.  Due to their performance, we will not focus on the above firms in our 
analysis later on  
In order to narrow down the scope of our focus firm, Table 4.2 presents the US Portable 
Media Player Company Shares Information from 2005 to 2009. Apple remains at the top 
during the past 5 years, which took around 20% of the US market share of portable media 
industry. Other major players include SanDisk by 8.7%, Sony by 4.7%, Microsoft by 
4.6%, Creative by 2.9% and Samsung by 2.5% according to the market share in 2009. As 
shown in Table 4.2, “others: took around 50% of the total market share but the individual 
firm performance is neglected compared with the top performance firms we have listed 
above. According to the market share information shown in Table 4.2, we have decided 
to focus our analysis to the following companies: Sony, Creative, Apple, SanDisk, 





Table 4.2:  US Portable Media Player Company Shares 2005 to 2009 
US Portable Media Player Company Shares 2005-2009 
% retail volume 
    
  
Brand 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Apple 18 23.8 22.3 17.8 22.3 
Creative 3 5.3 5 5.5 2.9 
Sony 1.1 2.6 4.1 5.3 4.7 
SanDisk 12 23.5 22.2 16.7 8.7 
Microsoft Corp * 
  
2 3.8 4.6 
Samsung 1.6 2.8 3.4 4.2 2.5 
Philips Electronics 0.6 1.2 1.6 2.8 3.8 
Others 63.7 40.8 39.4 43.9 50.5 
Source: Trade associations, trade press, company research, trade interviews, Euromonitor 
International estimates 
* Notes:  Microsoft launched the first-generation Zune player in November 2006.  so the 
market share information for year 2005 and 2006 is not available.  
 
Creative entered this industry in the early stage of the flash drive based player. In April 
1999, Creative launched the NOMAD line of digital audio players and later introduced 
the MuVo and ZEN series of portable media players. Creative dominated the digital 
audio industry before the entry of Apple Computer with the iPod. In October 2001, Apple 
Computer (now known as Apple Inc.) unveiled the first generation iPod, a 5 GB hard 
drive based digital audio player with a 1.8" Toshiba hard drive. With the development of 
a Spartan user interface and a smaller form factor, the iPod was initially popular within 
the Macintosh community. In July 2002, Apple introduced the second generation update 
to the iPod. It was compatible with Windows computers through MusicMatch Jukebox. 
There was fierce competition between these two companies. Table 4.3 presents the 




year 2007. As shown in Table 4.3, both Creative and Apple have introduced new 















Table 4.3: Competition between Creative and Apple 
Creative





















Stone and ZEN 
Stone Plus 
Apple Apple iPod 2. Gen Apple iPod 3. Gen
Apple iPod 4. 
gen and iPod mini
Apple iPod 5. Gen 
and iPod Nano
Apple iPod 
Classic, Nano 3 
and Touch






For Sony, with much of its resources behind the MiniDisc, Sony continued to venture in 
its own technology trajectory. Its response in part was to keep pushing its Adaptive 
Transform Acoustic Coding (ATRAC) format. Sony also entered the market in the early 
stage in year 1999, but with a “Memory Stick Walkman”, which support ATRAC format 
instead of MP3 format. As MP3 was the dominant format for music files, the customer 
response was not that good. Sony launched its first MP3 Walkman in 2004, much too late, 
as Apple already dominated the market.  
The story of Samsung is quite different, compared with the above companies. They 
developed MP3 player in early 1999 and Creative entered this market with the Creative 
NOMAD, which was actually a rebranded Samsung Electronics Yepp YP-D40 player. 
Because of the strategy focus on memory business, which was much bigger than mp3 
player business, its management did not put much effort in this area. Seven former 
Samsung executives left in 1999 and formed ReignCom
4
. It adopted a different 
technological trajectory, which was the portable CD player capable of decoding MP3 
files on CDs. ReignCom did not launch MP3 player until 2003.  
In January 2004, SanDisk 
5
 introduced Cruzer™ Micro, which was a USB flash memory 
storage drive and a companion mp3 player. It can serve as either a USB storage drive or 
                                                 
4
 In 1999, Duk-Jun Yang and Rae-Hwan Lee left Samsung Electronics, along with five colleagues. They 
formed ReignCom, with Yang as CEO, originally as a semiconductor distributor, and then decided to 
capitalize on the growing MP3 player market. They decided to outsource manufacturing to AV Chaseway, 
located in Shenzhen, China, and contract product design to INNO Design, an industrial design company in 
Palo Alto, CA, while keeping R&D in-house. 
5
 SanDisk, the world's largest supplier of flash memory data storage card products, designs, manufactures 
and markets industry-standard, solid-state data, digital imaging and audio storage products using its 






. In January 2005, SanDisk introduced the SanDisk Sansa™ e100 series of 
portable digital audio players that use embedded flash memory to store digital music
7
. In 
November 2006, Microsoft launched the first-generation Zune player, working in close 
cooperation with Toshiba, which took the design of the player
8
. The first Zune model, the 
Zune 30, featured a capacity of 30 gigabytes, FM radio, and a 3 inch screen.  
We will illustrate the entry behaviors of each firm in detail in next chapter, including the 
firm information and the first product they have launched.  
 
4.4 Conclusion 
In conclusion, we have presented our focus industry and focus firms. We have begun 
with the historical review of the digital audio player industry, including the pre-mp3 story 
of Philips and Sony, the MP3 standard development history.  After that, we narrowed the 
digital audio player firms into our focus firms. This section founded the context of our 
single case research, and we will present our analysis and discussion in detail in next 
chapter.  
  
                                                 
6
 SanDisk Press Room, SanDisk introduces small-size cruzer micro usb flash drive and a companion mp3 
player, retrieved from  http://www.sandisk.com/about-sandisk/press-room/press-releases/2004/2004-01-08-
sandisk-introduces-small-size-cruzer-micro-usb-flash-drive-and-a-companion-mp3-player 
7









5 Analysis and Discussion 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyzes and discusses the data and information we have collected, in order 
to address the research questions we have raised in literature review. After presenting the 
research context and a brief introduction about the firms and products in last chapter, we 
present the information at firm and product level in detail. The information about each 
firm and its first launched products are presented chronologically. This includes the 
general information about the firm, their strategic and management practices, and the 
detailed information about how they launched their first digital audio players. This is then 
followed by the patent analysis based on the data collected from the United States patents 
and Trademark Office (USPTO) website. We analyze and discuss about the different 
entry strategies adopted by our focus firms based on the qualitative information and 
patent stock analysis.  
Next, we analyze the necessary complementary assets needed to commercialize digital 
audio player, and we then discuss about the possible factors that triggered the different 
entry strategies of our focus firms.  
 
5.2 Firm entry behavior analysis & Patent stock analysis 
According to the storage media, we categorize the digital audio players into flash based 
players and hard drive based players. Table 5.1 and Table 5.2 show the entry behaviors of 




about hardware capacity, connection between players and computer, music management 
software bundled with the product, and online music store bundled with the player. 
Although we have narrowed down into our focus firms in previous section, we still cover 
the information of early entrants.  
5.2.1 Early flash drive based player 
Table 5.1 presents the entry behaviors of the early flash drive based players. It begins 
when SaeHan introduced the very first digital audio player, MP Man, in February 1998, 
as shown in Table 5.1. This player featured 16MB capacity and a parallel port, but was 
not well received
9. This was followed by Diamond Multimedia‟s introduction of the Rio 
PMP with similar features in the same year, as shown in Figure 5.1. Diamond Multimedia 
received success at the very beginning with sales exceeding expectations (Menta, ), and 
interest and investment in digital music were subsequently spurred by its success 
(HarmonyCentral, 1998). The later performance of Diamond Multimedia was not very 







                                                 
9




Table 5.1: Early Flash Based Player Information 
Introduction 
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List of Features:  
 16-32MB Flash storage 
 91 x 70 x 165.5mm 
dimensions 
 Parallel port interface 





Figure 5.2: Rio PMP 300 
 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rio_PMP300  
 
As shown in Table 5.1, after Diamond Multimedia, in 1999 Creative and Sony launched 
their own portable players. In April 1999, Creative launched the NOMAD line of digital 
audio players with similar features and dominated the digital audio industry until the 
entry of Apple Computer with the iPod. In September 1999, Sony entered this industry 
Notes:  The top view shows 
the face of the player. The 
bottom view shows the edge 
of the player (including its 
proprietary connector) and 





with the Memory Stick Walkman, Sony NW-MS7, which supported Adaptive Transform 
Acoustic Coding (ATRAC) format, not MP3 format. Sony users needed to convert their 
MP3 files into ATRAC files. As MP3 was the dominant format of music files in 1999, 
Sony‟s choice of ATRAC instead of MP3 influenced the product‟s acceptance in the 
market (Peng, 2006).  
 
Figure 5.3: Creative Labs Nomad 
 







Notes: Creative‟s first player was launched in 
June of 1999. It had 32MB of memory, FM 
radio, voice recording, and a price tag of 
$429. The Nomad was the first player on the 
market that had docking capabilities, allowing 
users to slip the player into the dock to charge 




Figure 5.4: Sony NW-MS7 Memory Stick Walkman 
 
Source: http://www.amazon.com/Sony-NW-MS7-Memory-Stick-Walkman/dp/B00004UE8S  
 
In summary, Table 5.1 presents the entry behaviors of the flash drive based player firms, 
all with similar features except Sony. The performance of these early entrants was not 
very good and only Creative remains a major player in the later stages of this industry.  
 
5.2.2 Digital Audio Player Information in the later stage 
The limited memory of early flash drive players constrained the number of songs 
contained on the player. “Most were based on fairly small memory chips, either 32 or 64 
MB, which stored only a few dozen songs – not much better than a cheap portable CD 
player” (Joswiak Greg (Apple's vice president of iPod product marketing), ). Table 5.2 
Notes: The NW-MS7 was released 
towards the mid of 1999 as Sony's 
first hit at the portable music player 
industry. They produce this first 
model shipping with a white 64MB 
MagicGate Memorystick and built-in 
battery, selling aside with NW-









shows the hard drive based digital audio player and also players introduced in the later 
stage.  
As shown in Table 5.2, in late 1999, Compaq and HanGo co-developed the “Personal 
Jukebox” (HanGo PJB-100) which used a hard drive with a capacity of 4.8 GB. This 
began the next wave of digital audio player development. In January 2000, Creative 
introduced the Creative Nomad Jukebox with a capacity of 6 GB. Like the Remote 
Solutions PJB-100, it was big and heavy, weighing in at nearly a full pound. The increase 
in storage capacity also meant an increase in the size and the weight of the hard drive 
based players, and this made them less portable - the HanGo PJB-100
10
 weighed 9.9 oz 
and the Creative Nomad Jukebox
11
 weighed 14.0 oz. 
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Table 5.2: Digital Audio Player Information in the later stage 
Introduction 
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Figure 5.5: HanGo PJB-100 
 
(Source: http://anythingbutipod.com/2008/03/10th-anniversay-of-the-mp3-player/)  
 




Notes: HanGo PJB-100 was 
developed by Compaq and released 
by HanGo. It was the first MP3 player 
to use a hard drive for storage instead 
of flash memory. Instead of the 
normal 32/64MB capacity of that 
time, the player had a 4.86GB laptop 
hard drive. It was released with a 
price of $799. 
Notes: The Nomad Jukebox 
runs on four AA batteries 





 In October 2001, Apple Computer (now known as Apple Inc.) unveiled the first 
generation iPod, a 5 GB hard drive based digital audio player with a 1.8" Toshiba hard 
drive. At the time, the average size and weight for hard drive based portable digital music 
players were 22.3 cubic inches and 9.4 oz. (Peng, 2006).  The iPod was 7.62 cubic inches 
in size and 5.6 oz in weight, a big improvement in portability (Peng, 2006). The iPod was 
a huge success and it dominated this market in the long term, capturing around 20% of 
the US market share between 2003 and 2009.  
 




Sony also launched its first MP3 Walkman in 2004, but was much too late as Apple 
already dominated the market. As shown in Table 5.2, SanDisk and Microsoft entered 
this industry in 2004 and 2006, respectively. SanDisk began its first trial in the digital 
audio player industry with the introduction of a small-sized USB 2.0 hi-speed flash 
memory storage drive (its major business area) and a companion MP3 player. This 
Notes: The first iPod was released in late October 
2001, and was the first player to utilize Toshiba’s 
1.8″ hard drives. Despite being compatible only 
with Mac and only supporting Firewire, it sold well 
due to the size/storage solution and the easy 
interface. The first version was 5GB, but a 10GB 




product could serve as either a USB storage drive or an MP3 player
12
. In January 2005, 
SanDisk introduced the SanDisk Sansa™ e100 series of portable digital audio players 
that used embedded USB 2.0 flash memory to store digital music
13
. In November 2006, 
Microsoft launched the first generation Zune player, working in close cooperation with 
Toshiba which took in charge of the design of the player
14
. The first Zune model, the 
Zune 30, featured a capacity of 30 gigabytes, FM radio and a 3 inch screen. The Zune 
consisted of hardware (the player) and software (Zune marketplace), and also had a 
wireless Zune to Zune music sharing feature.  
 







                                                 
12
SanDisk Press Room, SanDisk introduces small-size cruzer micro USB flash drive and a companion mp3 
player, retrieved from http://www.sandisk.com/about-sandisk/press-room/press-releases/2004/2004-01-08-
sandisk-introduces-small-size-cruzer-micro-usb-flash-drive-and-a-companion-mp3-player 
1313




 Microsoft News, Microsoft's New Zune Digital Media Player on Store Shelves Tomorrow, retrieved 
from: http://www.zune.net/en-us/press/2006/1113-zune30gb.htm 
 
Notes: The one on the left side is 
Cruzer Micro-- USB 2.0 hi-speed flash 
memory storage drives. The right side 









Figure 5.10: Microsoft's Zune 30 
 
(Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zune_30)  
 
Feathers of Zune 30: 
Power: 3.7V Lithium-Ion Internal Battery 
Storage capacity: 30 GB Hard disk 
Connectivity: Wi-Fi, USB 
Online services:Zune Marketplace 
Dimensions:2.4 × 4.4 × 0.58 inches 
Weight:5.6 ounces 
Notes: The Sansa e100 series is a 
monochromatic player with a blue backlight, 
FM tuner with 20 presets, SRS WOW 
technology, an SD expansion slot capable of 
using cards up to 2 GB (non-SDHC), internal 
memory of 512 MB (e130) or 1 GB (e140), 
depending on the model, and uses a single 
AAA battery for power. It supports MP3, 




In a short summary, Table 5.1 presented the entry behaviors of early flash drive based 
players, and Table 5.2 is for those in the later stage. As we have mentioned in previous 
section “focus firm”, we will only focus on the following firms in the later stage: Apple, 
Creative, Microsoft, SanDisk, Sony and Samsung.  
 
5.2.3 Patent Analysis 
In addition to the above qualitative data, we present evidence from patent document to 
support our analysis. The patent search is based on the USPTO websites from 1991 until 
2009, including the major digital audio player firms.  
In order to analyze our focus firms‟ performance in intellectual property, we present the 
patent stock counts for each firm in Table 5.3. Table 5.3 also indicates the time that each 
firm launched their first product. We can see differences between when firms entered this 


























1999 5 5 6 2 1
2000 6 50 16 18 3 1 3
2001 44 57 97 39 7 17 8
2002 38 79 117 43 35 34 3
2003 91 95 109 81 22 49 16
2004 145 265 185 53 43 33 19
2005 255 360 251 112 60 36 28
2006 453 211 216 106 117 51 16
2007 547 174 144 78 213 69 10
2008 480 162 87 54 194 25 5
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As show in Table 5.3, Apple launched its first product in October 2001 and had been 
filing patent applications since 2000. Creative launched its first product in April 1999 and 
had also been filing patent applications since 2000. The clear gap between their new 
product introduction time and the time they first filed patent application  suggests that 
Apple and Creative relied on other competitive competences for their initial success, 
rather than building up their intellectual property first. 
The entry behaviors of Microsoft and SanDisk are also illustrated in Table 5.4. Microsoft 
filed patents continuously from 1999 onward, but did not launch its first product until late 
2006. SanDisk began patent applications in 1999 and applied for patents continuously 
later on. It introduced its first digital audio player as a companion to the USB drive in 
January 2004 and came out with an official digital audio player in January 2005. Both 
SanDisk and Microsoft entered this market quite late, as shown in the table, and there is a 
gap of several years between initial patent applications and new product introduction. We 
conclude that SanDisk and Microsoft built up their intellectual property first before they 
entered this market. 
Samsung is a very different case. As shown in Table 5.4, Samsung owns the most patents 
(2211 in total) and started to file patents at the very beginning. Moon, the innovator of the 
world‟s first digital audio player the MPMan F10, had worked for Samsung before he 
joined SaeHan. In 1998, his suggestion to develop a portable player to play MP3 files 
was rejected because of the organizational restructuring of Samsung Electronics and the 
Asian financial crisis half a year later. Moon joined Saehan and developed the MPMan 
F10. Samsung developed an MP3 player in early 1999 and Creative entered the market 




YP-D40 player. Because of Samsung‟s strategy to focus on the memory business, a much 
bigger business than MP3 players, its management did not put much effort into this area. 
At the same time, they did not present designs or advertisements that appealed to youth. 
Samsung‟s weakness in user interface design and software impaired their ability to 
compete in the digital audio industry. Samsung is not competitive in products for which 
creativity and software matter or to which Samsung‟s magic formula of “speed and 
aggressive investment” does not apply (Chang, 2008). Samsung‟s strategy worked well 
when it was a follower, but the future of digital audio players was too uncertain for 
Samsung at the initial stage. Seven former Samsung executives left in 1999 and formed 
ReignCom
15
. This company adopted a different technological trajectory and developed a 
portable CD player capable of decoding MP3 files on CDs. ReignCom did not launch this 
MP3 player until 2003. 
Samsung has continuously filed patents during past few years. Its patents were quite 
diverse and covered numerous patents classes. Out of the 2211 patents filed by Samsung 
between our period of study, a large percentage of them is from IP Class H04: Electric 
communication technique. As a major player in the telecommunication industry, 
Samsung focused on the later integration of MP3 players into mobile phones and 
contributed to the fact that by 2006, more MP3 players were sold in musicphones than all 
stand-alone MP3 players put together.   Samsung had the competence to enter the digital 
audio player industry at the very early stage, but its performance was mainly decided by 
management strategy decisions.   
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 In 1999, Duk-Jun Yang and Rae-Hwan Lee left Samsung Electronics along with five colleagues. They 
formed ReignCom, with Yang as CEO, originally as a semiconductor distributor, and then decided to 
capitalize on the growing MP3 player market. They decided to outsource manufacturing to AV Chaseway, 
located in Shenzhen, China, and contract product design to INNO Design, an industrial design company in 




Sony pursued different technology trajectory and invested most its resource in another 
format, Adaptive Transform Acoustic Coding (ATRAC) format. As illustrated in the 
“Focus Firms” section, Sony‟s case was similar as Samsung, which has the competence 
to enter this industry, but their experiences were hugely influence by strategy decision.  
 
5.2.4 Conclusion of Firm Entry Strategies  
In this section, we have presented the firm entry behaviors and their patent stock counts. 
According to the time that firms first entered this market and the time they began to file 
patent, we categorize the firms into two categories:  
 Building up intellectual property first: such as SanDisk, Microsoft, Samsung and 
Sony.   
 Leveraging on complementary assets first: such as Apple and Creative.  
In the later sections, we will analyze the reasons why different firms adopted different 





5.3 Complementary Assets Analysis  
In Teece‟s (1986) conceptual framework, he argues the importance of complementary 
assets for successfully commercializing an innovation. After establishing the MP3 
standard, improvements on the performance of the MP3‟s complementary assets such as 
high-speed PCs, high capacity hard disks, high-speed Internet modems and especially the 
introduction of digital audio players greatly lifted the MP3 penetration rate and it began 
to erode the CD market. We will discuss the development of the MP3 format in detail 
from the perspective of the music management software, music content distribution, 
storage media and data transfer and connection, and then categorize the complementary 
assets that were necessary to successfully commercialize the digital audio player into 
generic or specialized assets.   
Generic assets do not need to be tailored to the innovation and can be easily contracted or 
acquired from the market, such as manufacturing facilities for making running shoes. 
Specialized assets hold unilateral dependence between the innovation and the 
complementary assets, such as the specific repair facilities that are needed to introduce 
the rotary engine. Co-specialized assets are characterized by a bilateral dependence, such 
as the containerization that is required for the deployment of some co-specialized assets 
in ocean shipping and terminals. Because the distinction between unilateral and bilateral 
dependence between the innovation and the complementary assets is not that critical to 
our analysis, in this thesis we will use the term “specialized complementary assets” to 





In order to identify the complementary assets that were necessary to successfully 
commercialize digital audio players, we built our framework using the following 
literature:  
 “The Influence of Major Pioneering Product Innovations and Technological 
Trajectories in High Technology Markets” (Peng, 2006): In this thesis, the author 
used digital audio players as one of two cases and he analyzed the key innovations 
involved in the digital audio player industry.  
 “How to be a Player: Making Money as A Portable Music Device Manufacturer” 
(Henderson, 2005): The authors analyzed the key dynamics underlying the digital 
audio player industry‟s structure and the array of competitive dimensions that 
manufacturers needed to access in order to commercialize the digital audio player .  
 “Who Captures Value in a Global Innovation System?” (Linden et al., 2007): The 
authors used the iPod as an example to analyze the parties that captured value 
from a successful innovation, using the framework of supply chain. Their 
argument reemphasized the importance of complementary assets in profiting from 
technological innovation (Teece, 1986).  
Based on the above literature, we analyzed the key innovations that drove the 
development of digital audio players and then categorized them into different 
complementary assets using the criteria of which competitive dimension it belongs to. 
After that, we verified them in the context of the supply chain of the digital audio player 
industry to check whether there were missing parts. In the following section, we will 




 Music Management Software,  
 Music Content Distribution,  
 Storage Media, Flash-based or Hard drive-based, and  
 Data Transfer (Connection between players and PCs).  
We will illustrate each of them in detail later on.  
 
5.3.1 Music Management Software 
After MP3 was included in the MPEG-2 standard, the next important development in 
MP3 innovation was the development of encoders and decoders, which are used to 
compress the MP3 files and play them on output devices (computers, players, etc). The 
early encoders and decoders developed by Fraunhofer required specific knowledge to 
encode or decode files, and this limited the initial popularity of MP3 audio files. In 1998, 
MusicMatch developed the very first codec (the combination of encoder/compression and 
decoder/decompression) for the consumer market. By 2004, before MusicMatch was 
acquired by Yahoo, it had been downloaded by more than 60 million users (Yahoo! Press 
Releases, 2004) and had about 225,000 paid subscribers (Hansell, 2004).   
The availability of music management software on the free market made it an uncritical 
barrier for entering the digital audio player industry. Table 8 shows the list of audio 
player software; most of them are cost free and quite a few are licensed under GPL
16
.  
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 The GNU General Public License (GNU GPL or simply GPL) is the most widely used free software 
license. The GPL is the first copyleft license for general use, which means that derived works can only be 
distributed under the same license terms. Under this philosophy, the GPL grants the recipients of a 
computer program the rights of the free software definition and uses copyleft to ensure the freedoms are 




Many digital audio players were bundled together with MusicMatch, especially at the 
initial stage of their entry. When Apple introduced the first iPod for Windows in 2002, 
they included the MusicMatch Jukebox to manage the user's music library and transfer 
music to the iPod. They stopped including the MusicMatch software when they 
introduced iTunes for Windows in 2003. The Rio MP3 player from Diamond Multimedia 
was also bundled with MusicMatch. Excluding MusicMatch, the most popular codecs in 
the consumer market are iTunes, RealJukebox and Microsoft Media Player. Firms can 
either develop their own music management software or bundle their MP3 player 
together with available software. As music management software can easily be 
outsourced or contracted from the market, we categorize music management software as 





Table 5.4: List of Audio Player Software 
Name Author 
Support 
MP3 Format Cost 
Software 
license 
ALLPlayer Allplayer ltd Yes Free Proprietary 
Amarok Mark Kretschmann Yes Free GPL 
aTunes Alex Aranda et al. Yes Free GPL 
Audacious Audacious Team Yes Free GPL 
Audion Panic Yes Free Proprietary 
Beep Media 
Player Milosz Derezynski Yes Free GPL 
cmus Timo Hirvonen Yes Free GPL 









Player François Ingelrest   Free GPL 
Exaile Adam Olsen 
Yes (Requires 
another sound 
system) Free GPL 
Flash MP3 
Player Reality Software Yes Free Proprietary 






          




Table 5.4: List of Audio Player Software (Continue)  
Name Author 
Support 
MP3 Format Cost 
Software 
license 
JuK Scott Wheeler Yes Free GPL 
Lalaclick Pascal Lehwark   Free GPL 
Listen Mehdi Abaakouk Yes Free GPL 
Media Jukebox J. River Yes Free Proprietary 
MediaMonkey 
Standard Ventis Media Inc. Yes Free Proprietary 
MediaMonkey 
Gold Ventis Media Inc. Yes Non-freeUSD$19.95 Proprietary 
MediaMonkey 
Lifetime Ventis Media Inc. Yes Non-freeUSD$29.95 Proprietary 
MPXPLAY MPXPLAY Yes Free GPL 
Music on 
Console Damian Pietras   Free GPL 
Music Player 
Daemon Warren Dukes   Free GPL 
MusicBee Steven Mayall Yes Free Proprietary 
musikCube Casey Langen Yes Free BSD 
Napster 
William 
Christopher Gorog Yes Non-freeUSD$9.95+ Proprietary 
QuickPlayer Jan Vorel Yes Free GPL 






Table 5.4: List of Audio Player Software (Continue)  
Name Author 
Support 
MP3 Format Cost 
Software 
license 
Rhythmbox Colin Walters 
Yes (Requires 
another sound 
system) Free GPL 
Sonique Media Science Yes Free Proprietary 
Style Jukebox 
Antiu M. Ionut 
Alexandru   Free Proprietary 
UADE Heikki Orsila   Free GPL 
XMMS XMMS Team Yes Free GPL 
Zinf Zinf Team Yes Free GPL 




Note 1: Proprietary software is computer software licensed under exclusive legal right of its owner. The 
purchaser, or licensee, is given the right to use the software under certain conditions, but restricted from 







Table 5.4: List of Audio Player Software (Continue)  
 
Note 2: The GNU General Public License (GNU GPL or simply GPL) is the most widely used free 
software license. The GPL is the first copyleft license for general use, which means that derived works 
can only be distributed under the same license terms. Under this philosophy, the GPL grants the 
recipients of a computer program the rights of the free software definition and uses copyleft to ensure 




5.3.2 Music Content Distribution: Online Music Files and Online Music Store 
The availability of MP3 music files was another big improvement in the adoption of the 
MP3 format. MP3 files first became popular among college students as they were easy to 
access using the high bandwidth offered by the campus network (Haring, 2001) during 
the early stage when internet speed was still a barrier for MP3 adoption.  The common 
means at that time for internet users to access or exchange MP3 music files were bulletin 
board systems (BBS), internet relay chat (IRC) and file transfer protocol (FTP) 
(Alderman, 2001; Haring, 2001). The Internet Underground Music Archive (IUMA) was 
the internet‟s first free high fidelity online music archive of downloadable songs and 
started in 1993. 
MP3.com was another development for free music downloads. It allowed users to 
download music for free and offered musicians a chance to be heard by the public 
without the support of big record labels (Alderman, 2001; Haring, 2001). Due to music 
file pirating and copyright concerns, the big five record labels (Warner Music, Sony 
Music, Universal, BMG and EMI) launched the secure digital music initiative (SDMI). 
Regarding the legal issue, LiquidAudio.com and a2b.com adopted different strategies to 
sell downloadable music files with proprietary anti-pirating technology (Goodell, 1999). 
Regarding the low bandwidth problem in the mid 1990s, internet radio such as RealAudio 
emerged to provide online music without the lengthy download times.  
Napster was another important improvement for online music files. Although users could 
find MP3 files from various sources, as mentioned above, it was difficult to search out 




application to exchange MP3 files between users. Napster had more than 70 million 
registered users at its peak (Menn, 2003) and caused the explosive growth of many 
similar applications. In December 1999, the Recording Industry Association of America 
(RIAA) filed a copyright lawsuit against Napster on behalf of the major record labels. 
Napster lost the lawsuit
17
 and struck a deal with Bertelsmann
18
. Napster added a tracking 
device to its peer-to-peer network technology in order to develop an online music 
subscription-based download service. 
In 2000, Sony Music, one of the major record labels, began to sell music online through 
“The Store”. However, because of difficulties with navigation and use, the service did not 
do as well as was hoped. Additionally, the price of US$3.50 per song discouraged many 
early adopters and “The Store” soon failed. Later on, Universal Music Group and Sony 
Music collaborated with a service called Duet (later renamed Pressplay), and EMI, 
Warner Music Group and BMG Music came out with MusicNet. Both services struggled 
due to high prices and limitations on how to use the purchased music files. Due to 
decreasing CD sales, the big record labels were anxious about the threat from online 
music downloading. In the late 1990s they rejected requests from MP3.com and eMusic 
to sell digital songs online. With the increased popularity of online music downloading, 
they decided to start their own service, but without a bright outcome. 
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 After a failed appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court, an injunction was issued on March 5, 2001 ordering 
Napster to prevent the trading of copyrighted music on its network. In July 2001, Napster shut down its 
entire network in order to comply with the injunction. On September 24, 2001, the case was partially 
settled. Napster agreed to pay music creators and copyright owners a $26 million settlement for past, 
unauthorized uses of music, as well as an advance against future licensing royalties of $10 million. In order 
to pay those fees, Napster attempted to convert their free service to a subscription system. Thus traffic to 
Napster was reduced. (Source: Napster from Wikipedia, retrieved from: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Napster)  
18




Digital audio downloads began to gain popularity after the launch of the iTunes Store 
(later renamed the iTunes Music Store) in April 2003. The iTunes Store is a software-
based online digital media store operated by Apple. The store began after Apple signed 
deals with the five major record labels at the time, EMI, Universal, Warner, Sony Music 
Entertainment and BMG (the last two would later merge to form Sony BMG). Music 
from more than 2,000 independent labels was added later, the first from The Orchard on 
June 24, 2003. Since the introduction of the iTunes Store, individual songs have been 
sold for the same price with no subscription fee (this was in contrast to most existing 
online music stores at the time which charged a monthly fee for access to their catalog). 
In April 2007, iTunes accounted for 80% of the digital music market (Ciara, 2007). In 
April 2008, the iTunes store surpassed Wal-Mart as the biggest music retailer in the US, 
















Figure 5.11: Number of Songs Sold on the iTunes 
 
(Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ITunes_Store#Market_share_and_milestones) 
(Notes: The horizontal axis is shown in mm/yy format and vertical axis is shown in units 
(number of songs) format) 
As shown in Table 5.5, popular online music stores include: 7 digital (approx. 8 million 
songs), Amazon MP3 (approx. 12 million songs), eMusic (approx. 6 million songs), 
immergent.com (approx. 8 million songs), iTunes Store (approx. 12 million songs), 
Napster (approx. 9 million songs), Rhapsody (approx. 9 million songs) and Zune 






Table 5.5: Online Music Store Summary 
Store
Selection 
(approximately) Platform Format Preview Trial Other
7digital 8,000,000 songs
Platform Independent for MP3 
songs
192, and 320 kbit/s MP3; 
192, and 320 kbit/s AAC; 
192 kbit/s WMA; FLAC 




Amazon MP3 11,782,582 songs
Platform independent for 
individual tracks and browsing 
the store, Amazon MP3 
Downloader is required for 
downloading albums (Windows 
98 or later, Mac OS X or 
Linux) 256 kbit/s VBR MP3 30 seconds None
Amazon MP3 
Downloader integrates 







Windows 98 or 
later; Linux; Mac OS 9/X
256 kbit/s VBR MP3, 
older tracks: 192 kbit/s 






approx. 8 million 
songs Platform independent up to 320 kbit/s MP3 30 seconds None
Charts, Rating, user 
profiles, blog, chat, 
social networking 
features
256 kbit/s VBR AAC
128 kbit/s AAC; 
256 kbit/s VBR AACiTunes Store 12,000,000+ songs
Mac OS X 10.4.11 or later; 
Windows XP Service Pack 2 




TV Shows; Music 








Table 5.5: Online Music Store Summary (Continue)  
Site
Selection 
(approximately) Platform Format Preview Trial Other
Moozone 6,300,000 songs Platform independent MP3 320 kbit/sec 30 seconds None
Online music storage 
(personal digital 
locker), social network
Napster Web application 
(Windows/Mac/Linux), Internet 
Explorer 7.x (Recommended)
or Firefox 2.x, Flash Player 8+; 
Napster software application 
(Windows only): Windows 




Windows 98 or later, Mac OS 
X, Linux
128, 160, and 192 kbit/s 
(depending on 
subscription) WMA, or 
256 kbit/s MP3 30 seconds 14 days
25 Free streams a 
month
Zune 
Marketplace 5,000,000 songs Windows XP or higher
192 kbit/s WMA; 256, 




Videos, TV Shows, 
Movies, Movie 
Rentals, Movie 















30 seconds. 7 days
Hi-res. album art 
includedNapster 9,000,000 songs
Purchase: 128, and 
256 kbit/s DRM-free 
MP3;]Subscription: 128, 
and 192 kbit/s WMA
 
For the music content, many companies have tried different strategies with or without 
proprietary anti-pirating technology. As shown above, the performance of music content 
distribution could be divided to the following phase:  
 First adoption among college students through BBS, IRC, and FTP,  
 Websites such as MP3.com that allowed users to download music for free and 
provided the musicians a chance to be heard by public without the support of 
big record labels,  
 LiquidAudio.com and a2b.com sold downloadable music files with 
proprietary anti-pirating Technology 
 Internet radio such as RealAudio emerged to provide online music without 
downloading them,  
 Napster provided the peer to peer (P2P) file sharing application to exchange 
MP3 files among users, 
 Practices by Record Labels:  
 Sony, with 'The Store'.  
 Universal and Sony launched Duet, and EMI, Time Warner and BMG came 
out with MusicNet  
 Cooperation between online music providers and Record Labels: 
 iTunes Store by Apple 





Before the launch of iTunes, the problem of illegal downloading was a major concern of the 
record labels. Even though they were aware of the threat from online music, the big record 
companies still rejected collaboration requests from MP3.com and eMusic in the late 
1990s.  After several failed attempts by the major labels to sell online music themselves, 
Apple‟s successful cooperation with the major record labels in 2003 was partly because 
of correct timing and partly because of branding. The ability to access music content is 
highly related to company‟s branding, which allowed Apple to sign deals with the five 
major record labels. Microsoft also has its own online music store. Based on the failures 
of eMusic and Mp3.com and the achievements of Apple and Microsoft, we conclude that 
music content distribution is a specific complementary asset and is highly influenced by a 
company‟s branding. 
 
5.3.3 Storage Media: Flash-based or Hard drive-based 
The first wave of entrants all offered flash memory based players, usually with 32 MB 
internal flash memory or removable flash memory cards up to 64 MB. In late 1999, 
Compaq and HanGo co-developed the “Personal Jukebox” which used a hard drive with 
a capacity of 4.8 GB. Several companies introduced hard drive based players later on. 
Currently, the hard drive based players can have a capacity up to 250 GB. Due to 
technological improvements in flash memory, the flash based players are now available 




In early 2000, SanDisk has begun to serve as a supplier for MultiMediaCard (flash 






. SanDisk markets 
to both the high-end and low-end sector demand for premium quality flash memory, and 
markets to other equipment makers as well as direct to consumers. As a global leader 
flash memory cards, SanDisk's serves as a major supplier for digital audio player. In 1999, 
Sony had introduced digital music player before Apple introduced iPod, which was 
theMemory Stick Walkman that enabled users to store music files in Sony‟s storage 
devices. SanDisk was also served as the supplier for the storage media: memory stick. In 
Oct1999, Creative released NOMAD II with SmartMedia memory cards, which was a 
flash memory card standard by Toshiba.  In 2000, Creative‟s Nomad Jukebox was 
achieved in cooperation with a 2.5" Fujitsu hard drive (In January 2009, Fujitsu reached 
an agreement to sell its HDD business to Toshiba). Apple cooperated with Toshiba, and 
the first generation iPod was featured with a 1.8" Toshiba hard drive in Oct 2001. The 
first-generation Zune from Microsoft was achieved also in close cooperation with 
Toshiba, which even redeveloped it under the name Toshiba 1089.  
According to the performance of our focus firms, all of them cooperated with upstream 
storage media suppliers regardless whether they used flash drives or hard drives. Because 
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 SanDisk Press Room, SanDisk will supply Ericsson with multimedia cards for new mp3 player 
















they are available in the market and do not need be tailored to the innovation, we 
categorize storage media as a generic complementary asset.  
5.3.4 Data Transfer/ Connection 
Most of the early flash drive based players used a parallel port and most of the early hard 
drive based players used a Universal Serial Bus (USB) 1.0 /1.1 to connect players with 
PCs. USB 1.0 was introduced in January 1996 and allowed for a 12 Mbps data rate, 
which took a long time to transfer music files. After Compaq and HanGo co-developed 
the hard drive based portable player which could store a large amount of data, the limited 
bandwidth for connecting players and PCs emerged as a new problem. Apple introduced 
the iPod in October 2001 and it used FireWire (IEEE-1394) which could transfer at a rate 
of 400 Mbps between players and PCs. In response to Apple‟s FireWire, some companies 
started to introduce players with USB 2.0 connections. USB 2.0 was released in April 
2000 and had a maximum bandwidth of 480 Mbps.  
As it is the connection between PCs and music players, the development of data transfer 
standards was significantly influenced by the support of major PC companies. PC data 
transfer standards have evolved from  
 Parallel port which was standardized by IBM in the 1980s and followed by HP,  
 USB developed by Compaq, DEC, IBM, Intel, Microsoft, NEC and Nortel in 
1994, 
 IEEE 1394/FireWire contributed by Apple, Texas Instruments, Sony, Digital 








The evolution of data transfer between PCs and music players has kept pace with PC 
standards: parallel ports, USB 1.0 then IEEE 1394/ USB 2.0. After the IEEE 1394 
standard was published in early 1995, Apple and Sony started to support IEEE 1394 due 
to their high levels of involvement in multimedia (Peng, 2006). Since 1998, Apple, Sony, 
NEC and Compaq have integrated IEEE 1394 ports into their PCs (Teener, 2004). 
Because Wintel PCs usually did not support FireWire ports, customers needed a FireWire 
card to connect iPods to Wintel PCs when Apple introduced the iPod in October 2001. 
Hence, the different connection type was not a voluntary choice of the music player firms 
(Peng, 2006). Since Apple‟s PCs were already integrated with IEEE 1394 ports, Apple 
had a unique opportunity to introduce a portable digital audio player with a high 
bandwidth connection as early as 2001.  In the case of the IEEE 1394 data connection, 
this was a specialized complementary asset when Apple launched their first generation 
iPod in October 2001.   
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 After the development of USB 2.0, the USB 3.0 specification was published on 12 November 2008, with 
data transfer rate up to 5 Gbps. We will not further discuss USB 3.0 in later stage as the first equipped USB 




5.4 Firm Entry Strategy 
In this section we discuss the possible reasons why firms adopt different entry strategies 
contingent with the complementary assets they hold. For firms with specific 
complementary assets (such as Creative and Apple), they can leverage these 
complementary assets to provide competitive competence and enter the industry before 
building up intellectual property.  
5.4.1 Creative Technology 
Creative Technology launched the Sound Blaster sound card in 1989 and set the de facto 
standard for PC audio. Its sound cards were among the first dedicated audio processing 
cards to be made widely available to mass consumers. Creative Technology was the first 
company to bundle the sound card system - digital audio, on-board music synthesizer, 
MIDI interface and a joystick port - and dominated the PC audio market until the late 
1990s. However, since the early 2000s, OEM PCs have been built with sound boards 
directly integrated onto the motherboard and Sound Blaster found itself reduced to a 
niche product. With pressure from the sound card industry, Creative started its venture 
into the digital audio player industry in the late 1990s. As a dominator in the PC audio 
industry and with experience in the multimedia industry, Creative realized the 
opportunity in the digital audio player industry and came out with the rebranded Samsung 
Yepp YP-D40 player as its own NOMAD player in April 1999.  
Creative entered into the digital audio player industry in early 1999 and became the 
market dominator until Apple introduced iPod in October 2001.  In 1999 when most flash 




portable digital audio player released in October 1999 featured USB connectivity (USB 
1.1) and multiple codec support. Sound Blaster connects to a PC‟s motherboard using a 
method such as a parallel port, USB, IEEE 1394, etc. Due to this experience with 
connections, it is not surprising that Creative introduced the NOMAD II with USB 1.1 
connectivity when most flash drive based players still used parallel port connection. In 
June 1999, Creative announced plans to offer broadband Internet access solutions and 
collaborated with Lucent Technologies (the leader in developing USB 2.0) and 
Centillium to offer high-speed, high-bandwidth solutions. In December 1999, Creative 
announced broad support for the Macintosh platform. Creative's popular line of Sound 
Blaster® Live! Audio solutions and Personal Digital Entertainment (PDE) solutions, 
which included the NOMAD line of portable audio devices and the WebCam Go line of 
portable PC cameras, were the first in a series of products from Creative to support the 
Mac . Dominance in the PC audio industry and collaboration enabled Creative to 
introduce the Nomad Jukebox 2 in September 2002 which featured USB 2.0, which has a 
speed comparable to FireWire, and the Nomad Jukebox Zen in October 2002, which 
featured USB 1.1 and FireWire. For the music content, in April 2000 Creative invested in 
Soundbuzz.com, an online digital download music distributor that offered the sampling, 
promoting and purchasing of downloadable music from the Internet in secure MP3 
format from Asian and international record labels as well as from unsigned artists 
(Creative Technology, 2000). However, Creative‟s control over music content was much 
weaker than Apple‟s and the performance of Soundbuzz was much worse than the iTunes 
store. In summary, Creative was able to leverage on its leading-edge audio technology, 




market. It was a market dominator before Apple introduced the iPod and remains a major 
player even now.   
5.4.2 Apple 
When Apple introduced its first iPod in Oct 2001, a few firms have introduced hard drive 
based players, but all were too big and bulky, and lacked a good user interface. The hard 
drive based players on market were all incorporated with 2.5-inch Fujitsu drive. In 
February 2001, when Jon Rubinstein, a veteran engineer who headed up Apple‟s 
hardware division for more than a decade
23
, made a routine visit to Toshiba during the 
annual Macworld Expo, he noticed the 1.8 inches drive that Toshiba just developed. At 
the time, Toshiba even did not know what to do with the new drive. Jon Rubinstein 
figured out how they might use it and “Jon is very good at seeing a technology and very 
quickly assessing how good it is” and “The iPod is a great example of Jon seeing a piece 
of technology‟s potential: the very, very small form-factor hard drive”24. The increase in 
storage also caused a long time to transfer between players and PCs. For the data transfer, 
Apple and Sony started to support IEEE 1394 after the standard was published in early 
1995, due to their high levels of involvement in multimedia (Peng, 2006). Since 1998, 
Apple, Sony, NEC and Compaq have integrated IEEE 1394 ports on their PCs (Teener, 
2004). Hence Apple had a unique opportunity to introduce a portable digital audio player 
with a high bandwidth connection to their computers as early as 2001.  
For Apple‟s ability to access to music content, it is highly related to its brand, which 
allowed Apple to sign deals with the five major record labels. Before the launch of iTunes, 
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the problem of illegal downloading was the major concern of record labels. Although in front 
of the threat, they still rejected the request of MP3.com, eMusic to sell online digital songs 
in the late 1990‟s. With several failed practices of selling online music by themselves, 
Apple‟s success to cooperate with major record label in 2003 was partly because of the 
correct time, and partly because of the it‟s branding.  ITunes Music store has achieved 
huge success, which accounts for 70% of worldwide online digital music sales, making 
the service the largest legal music retailer and with over 5 billion downloads by June 19, 
2008.
25
 Although with a great brand and bright performance, it is still not that easy to 
manage the music store and the relationship with big record labels. In September 2010, 
Warner Bros. execs find Apple's 99 cent TV show rentals too cheap. Barry Meyer, chief 
executive of Warner Bros., said his company decided to not participate in Apple's 
proposal for 99 cent TV episode rentals, because they feel the price is too low
26
.  The 
difficulty to manage the music content distribution made it understandable to have Apple 
as the first firm to come out with iTunes Music Store. The development of iPod relied 
heavily on its in-house expertise (Kahney, 2008), such as Jon Rubinstein‟s suggestion of 
1.8 inches drive as we mentioned before. The idea of the famous scroll wheel was even 
suggested by Apple‟s head of marketing, Phil Schiller. In summary, Apple could leverage 
on its IEEE 1394 (Data Transfer) which was already incorporated in its PCs, its branding 
advantage of leadership and quality to cooperate with big record labels (music content 
distribution), and user interface design and in-house expertise accumulated from the 
personal computer industry, to introduce iPod in early 2001.  
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The previous industry experience in multimedia industry has provided Apple and 
Creative the necessary competence to enter digital audio industry. After establishing a 
foothold by leveraging on complementary assets, both Apple and Creative have invested 
in R&D and marketing to remain competitive in this industry.  Creative has filed for 
patent continuously, including the U.S. Patent 6,928,433
27
 applied on January 5, 2001 
and awarded the patent on August 9, 2005.  The ZEN Patent was awarded to Creative for 
the invention of user interface for portable media players. This is also the cause of the 
lawsuit with Apple and other competitors. On May 16, 2006, Creative Technology sued 
Apple for alleged infringement of a Zen patent in the United States
28
.  In order to 
compete with Apple, in November 2004 Creative announced a $100 million marketing 
campaign to promote their digital audio products, including the ZEN range of MP3 
players. 
For those firms (such as SanDisk and Microsoft), most of the complementary assets they 
held were all generic, which could be outsourced in market very easily. Hence, they 
began with building intellectual property first and then leveraged their existing 
complementary assets.  
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Before it entered the digital audio player market, SanDisk was the leading provider of 
flash memory cards used in digital cameras, digital audio players and other consumer 
electronics. The entry strategy adopted by SanDisk is a typical forward integration from 
flash memory cards supplier to the digital audio player industry. Although SanDisk had a 
cost advantage by also being a storage media supplier, this advantage was not enough for 
a component manufacturer like SanDisk to overcome its relative weakness. SanDisk was 
weak in its user interface design and also in branding in consumer electronics, which 
limited its access to music content. The gap between embedded memory card design and 
glamorous consumer electronics design was a huge barrier in the initial stage for 
SanDisk‟s entry into this industry (Henderson, ). The generic complementary assets 
(storage media) held by SanDisk could not provide enough competence to leverage in 
order to enter the digital audio player industry. Since all of SanDisk‟s complementary 
assets were generic and insufficient to compete in the market, building on intellectual 
property first was one way for SanDisk to enter into this industry. SanDisk started patent 
applications around 2001
29
 and started its first trial in the digital audio player industry in 
January 2004. Its first trial was still based on its core competence product, a small-sized 
USB 2.0 hi-speed flash memory storage drive, and the digital audio player served as a 
companion. One year later in January 2005, SanDisk officially introduced the SanDisk 
Sansa™ e100 series of portable digital audio players that used embedded USB 2.0 flash 
memory to store digital music. In summary, the gap between the embedded memory card 
industry and the glamorous consumer electronics industry and the generic complementary 
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assets (storage media) held by SanDisk made it infeasible for Samsung to leverage on its 
complementary assets to enter the digital audio player industry. This could explain the 
possible reason why SanDisk adopted the approach to build on intellectual property first 
in order to enter this industry.  
5.4.4 Microsoft 
In November 2006 Microsoft launched the Zune its first digital audio player, which 
showed Microsoft‟s effort to build competencies in the electronics hardware industry. 
When Microsoft entered this industry, the industry was already quite solid and the 
appearance of Microsoft‟s Zune was quite similar to Apple‟s iPod. Microsoft is a giant in 
the software industry with strong competence in software design and licensing and its 
Windows Media Player is among the most popular codecs in the consumer market. As 
analyzed in a previous section, music management software is a generic complementary 
asset and could not provide strong enough competence for Microsoft to leverage in order 
to establish a foothold in this industry. Also, Microsoft had a strong brand reputation 
which allowed it to create the MSN Music download store in 2004 to compete with 
Apple's iTunes Music Store. However, its sales were negligible by comparison. It started 
out with 1.5 million songs, but decreased to 1.1 million songs mainly due to lagging sales 
and lack of real support from Microsoft. Although Microsoft had the ability to access 
music content distribution, it did not leverage it sufficiently. The first generation of Zune 
was not even compatible with the MSN store. It is important to have access to 
complementary assets, but it is even more important to leverage them effectively. 
Although it was a giant with dynamic capability (Maccormack, & Iansiti, 2009; Teece et 




complementary asset and it did not fully utilize its ability to access music content 
distribution. This could explain the possible reason why Microsoft built up intellectual 
property first (starting in 1999) and leveraged its complementary assets later on to enter 
the digital audio player industry in November 2006.  
The initial 6 month market feedback for Zune was not that good and Zune fell to 5
th
 place 
with a 2% share of the market (10.2% share of the market for 30GB devices). Its inability 
to allow users to download from the internet, incompatibility with Microsoft‟s own 
PlayForSure
30
 standard and incompatibility with rivals‟ software drew negative feedback 
from customers. Even the analysts‟ recommendation was to drop the hardware and 
license software instead, meaning Microsoft should abandon the MP3 market as a 
hardware provider and focus on providing licensed software to all iPod rivals. This would 
allow Microsoft to focus on its core competences of software design and licensing (Joiner, 
2006). Microsoft maintains less than a 5% market share in the US market. The software 
giant‟s experience in hardware electronics is not that promising. In the autumn of 2009, 
Microsoft launched Zune HD, a much improved device in terms of aesthetics and feel. 
The product received good reviews and quickly sold out. However, it is widely believed 
that leading national electronics retailers like Best Buy and Wal-Mart lacked confidence 
in the product‟s success and under-ordered (Euromonitor International: Country Sector 
Briefing July 2010, ).  
For SanDisk and Microsoft, they either did not have the necessary specialized 
complementary assets or they did not sufficiently leverage their specialized 
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complementary assets. It is thus reasonable that both adopted the strategy of building up 
intellectual property first.  
For Sony, although it held the necessary complementary assets, both generic and 
specialized, it did not leverage them effectively. With a great brand name, design ability 
and even its own record label, Sony was more sensitive about protecting its music content 
from illegal downloading. Digital music, which was an opportunity for many firms, 
became a threat to Sony. Because of the different strategy focus and the different 
technological trajectory pursued, Sony entered into this market too late.  
 
5.5 Research Discussion  
Our analysis of the digital audio player industry illustrated two types of de-alio entry 
strategies. Based on their patent stock information and market entry information, we have 
determined that there exist two different entry behaviors by de-alio entrants. Some of the 
de-alio firms initially relied upon their existing complementary assets to enter the market, 
such as Apple and Creative, especially when they wanted to enter the market in a short 
time frame. After gaining a foothold in the market, they invested aggressively in R&D to 
develop a portfolio of intellectual property (both Creative and Apple have invested in 
R&D to enable their firms to value, assimilate and exploit new knowledge (Rothaermel, 
& Hill, 2005)). Alternatively, there were firms that began to patent aggressively before 
entering the market and leveraged on their complementary assets only after entering the 
market, such as Microsoft and SanDisk. For these firms there was a gap of a few years 




first product. In order to explain the possible reasons for the different entry behaviors, we 
have adopted the approach of complementary assets. We have identified the necessary 
complementary assets (music management software, music content distribution, storage 
media and data transfer) to commercialize the technology and categorized them into two 
different categories: generic and specialized complementary assets. Our results reflect 
that the different entry behaviors are contingent on the different complementary assets 
that firms hold. For the de-alio entrants with specialized complementary assets (Apple 
and Creative), they could leverage on their existing specialized complementary assets to 
enter along a technology trajectory and establish a foothold in the market first. For the 
firms with generic complementary assets (SanDisk and Microsoft), they do not have a 
sufficient competitive advantage to leverage on, so building up intellectual property first 






In this chapter, we have begun with the historical overview of digital audio player 
industry, followed by the data of each firm and their first launched product. We examined 
their performance when they entered into digital audio player industry. We also 
undertook a patent analysis to analyze firms‟ intellectual property performance. We tried 
to find out the gap in time when the firms first launched their products and they first filed 
patent applications. After that, we presented the complementary assets analysis to discuss 
the necessary complementary assets that are needed to commercialize digital audio 
players.   
Next, we presented our discussion and summarized all the findings from the case study. 
We answered the research questions raised in the literature review chapter. We conclude 
that  
 There did exists different entry strategies for de-alio entrants and  
 The different entry strategies adopted by different de-alio entrants could be 
explained by the different kind of complementary assets they are holding: generic 
versus specialized complementary assets.  
We believe these finding would contribute to the research stream of entry strategy and 
also would benefit managers on strategic decision making. In the next chapter, we present 





6 Findings and Conclusion 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we first summarize the research findings from our in-depth case study of 
the digital audio player industry. Contributions to literature and practical management as 
well as the limitations of this study are then outlined. We will close our research by an 
overall conclusion.  
 
6.2 Research Findings 
We were motivated to conduct this research to study the entry strategy of de-alio entrants. 
After we analyzed the reasons why some incumbent firms may fail due to the competition 
from the new entrants, and the central drivers of start-up commercialization strategy 
proposed by different researchers, we understood that de-alio entrants could adopt 
different entry strategies, leveraging on complementary assets first and building up 
intellectual property later. We query that whether this was the only possible entry strategy 
for de-alio entrants, and raised the research questions for our study:  
 Whether there exist different entry strategies for de-alio entrants and  
 What are the possible factors that trigger the different entry strategies adopted by 
different de-alio entrants, 
After an investigation of a detailed case study of digital audio player industry, we 




digital audio player industry and also the possible factors that triggered the different 
strategies. Our research findings are:  
 There exist different entry strategies for de-alio entrants: leverage on 
complementary assets first and then build on intellectual property, or vice-versa.  
 The different entry strategies adopted by different de-alio entrants could be 
explained by the different kind of complementary assets they are holding: generic 
versus specialized complementary assets. Specialized assets could serve as a 
source of competitive advantage and allow de-alio entrant to establish a foothold 
on market first. As generic complementary assets can be frequently contracted for 
in the market on competitive terms, there is no significant competitive advantage 
of de-alio entrants to leverage. Hence, it is appropriate for them to adopt similar 
strategy as de-novo entrants to first invest on intellectual property. 
 
6.3 Contribution to the Literature 
This thesis makes a number of contributions to the literature. Firstly, our study has 
confirmed the presence of de-alio entrants and their entry strategy as proposed by He et 
al.(2003), and discussed the possible existence of different entry strategies on the context 
of the complementary asset they hold. The advantage of de-alio firms is that they have 
access to network, branding, manufacturing and other complementary assets that are 
necessary at the initial stages of entry (Cohen, & Levinthal, 1989). Our study underlined 
the study of He et al. (2003) which showed that de-alio firms could leverage their existing 




shows that there exist two possible entry behaviors: leveraging on existing 
complementary assets first followed by building up intellectual property or vice-versa. 
Secondly, it is well known that successful innovation not only requires competencies in 
upstream R&D, but also in the downstream complementary assets needed to 
commercialize the innovation (Teece, 1986). The importance of complementary assets is 
highlighted by the failure of several early entrants in the digital audio player industry. 
Our study suggests that the different entry paths followed by de-alio entrants are 
contingent on the kind of complementary assets they hold: specialized or generic. As 
generic complementary assets can be easily contracted from the market on competitive 
terms, there is no significant competitive advantage for de-alio entrants to leverage. 
Hence, it is appropriate for them to adopt a similar strategy as de-novo entrants to first 
invest in intellectual property. Specialized complementary assets are generally valuable 
and usually difficult to imitate because they are usually built over a long period of time 
and are path dependent. Compared with generic complementary assets, specialized assets 
can serve as a source of competitive advantage (Chesbrough, 2003) and allow de-alio 
entrants to establish a foothold in the market first. We would like to qualify that we only 
provide an observation on how de-alio entrants can adopt two different paths of entry, 
depending on the complementary assets they hold. Our analysis will not go in depth into 
which strategy is better or whether these two entry paths could be extended to other 
industries.   
Our research also has an implication on firms‟ innovation management, especially when 
firms plan to enter a new industry where they could be treated as de-alio entrants. 




entry strategies of de-alio entrants and we have not gone in depth to substantiate which 
strategies would be better under what conditions, we will still propose a few suggestions 
for firms‟ innovation management and future research could test our hypothesis. When 
firms do not have access to specialized complementary assets, the strategic focus should 
be on R&D investment and management and the strategies of building up intellectual 
property are a better choice. When firms have access to specialized complementary assets 
and can leverage them in the early stages, it is a better choice to leverage existing 
complementary assets to gain an early foothold. At the same time, it is also important for 
firms to keep an open view and exploit existing resources for either strategy. 
 
6.4 Implications for Open Innovation 
Our study demonstrates the importance of openness, especially when there is time 
pressure or technological weakness. To increase the speed-to-market of its new products, 
especially since there were already several companies in the digital audio player industry, 
Apple adopted an open innovation strategy (Levin et al., 1987). Apple licensed the 
SoundJam MP3 Music player from a small company and hired its programmer, Jeff 
Robbin, to modify its music management software into iTunes (mostly making it simpler).  
Apple hired Tony Fadell, a former employee of General Magic and Philips who wanted 
to invent a better MP3 player, to create and lead a team of 35 people from Philips, IDEO, 




charge of the user interface and design
31
. It took only 6 months for Apple to launch the 
iPod. The open innovation perspective that advocates the importance of opening up the 
innovation process to external ideas suggests that a firm‟s ability to integrate ideas from 
the external environment can compensate for its technological weakness (Botha, 2010). 
Apple demonstrated a positive example of exploiting existing available resources, but 
Microsoft served as the opposite example.  Microsoft created the MSN Music download 
store to compete with Apple's iTunes Music Store 2 years before it launched its first 
product. However, it did not leverage it sufficiently and there was no timely management 
support. The first generation of Zune was not even compatible with the MSN store. It is 
important to have access to complementary assets, but it is even more important to 
leverage and utilize them effectively. 
 
6.5 Implication for Exploitation and Knowledge Flow 
Regarding the importance of leveraging and fully utilizing existing complementary assets, 
another important contribution of our study is with regards to the literature of exploitation 
and knowledge flow. Some firms, though having strong intellectual property, are not 
good at exploiting their existing competences to gain commercial benefits. Their high-
impact patents are more heavily cited or exploited by competitors instead of by 
themselves, which represents the knowledge flow to their competitors. As analyzed in the 
previous section, Samsung‟s performance was mainly decided by its management and 
strategic decisions. It is similar to the case of Motorola as described in He. et. al (2003), 
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as both firms had strong intellectual property to start with. Due to the weak exploitation 
of their existing intellectual property, the performance of Samsung was not as good as its 
competitors who entered later. For the knowledge flow, based on our observation that 
Creative entered the market with a rebranded Samsung player and ReignCom was formed 
by seven former Samsung executives in 1999, we hypnotize the existence of possible 
knowledge flow between Samsung and other firms that began to file patents later.  
However, further research would be needed on the citation trace to analyze such 
knowledge flow in detail.  
 
6.6 Implication for Collaboration 
Our study also implies the importance of collaboration. During the past few decades, 
there has been increasing growth in collaborations. Firms have evolved from vertical 
integration to increased collaboration with partners throughout the whole product life-
cycle, from the early stages of R&D and manufacturing to the later stages of marketing 
and distribution. The music content distribution methods illustrated in our study highlight 
the importance of collaboration. For several years, the recording industry has been 
fighting music piracy by suing software and website developers and customers (Easley, 
2005). With the increasing threat from online sales, almost all the big record labels 
resorted to online distribution. After failed attempts to sell online music themselves, they 
finally collaborated with Apple and other firms to distribute music online. This 
collaboration offered record labels an opportunity to access new markets and speed up 




involved risk sharing between the record labels and the digital audio player firms, which 
is also the most common rationale for collaboration. Collaboration also involves risk, 
which is the reason why the record labels rejected offers from several other online 
distribution websites before the invitation from Apple. A lack of trust between the parties, 
difficulties in relinquishing control, the complexity of a joint project and differential 
abilities to learn new skills are all barriers to effective collaboration (Powell et al., 1996). 
Due to its well know brand, reputation for innovation and path-dependent performance 
on collaboration, Apple succeeded to be the first digital audio player firm to collaborate 
with the big record labels. The management of collaboration is also challenging, such as 
the complaint about the 99 cent price from Warner and its subsequent decision not to 
participate in Apple‟s proposal for 99 cent TV episode rentals.  
 
6.7 Limitations 
Our interpretation has a number of limitations. First, the research is mainly based on 
information from the internet and company websites and lacks primary data. We have 
tried to minimize this limitation by collecting data from multiple resources to validate the 
collected data and collecting information from online expert opinions and analyst 
critiques. Another limitation is the patent data and patent classifications we used in our 
research to identify companies‟ entry strategies. This approach might be limited as not all 
companies have the same propensity to patent and there is huge variation between 
companies in how much they rely on patents and other forms of intellectual property 




may limit their patents to only their most successful innovations and not all inventions are 
patented. We use the application year instead of the issue year to make sure that the date 
is closer to the date of invention. Bearing in mind the above limitations, patent data has 
been successfully used in the analysis of innovation (Gittelman, & Kogut, 2003; Carroll 
et al., 1996).  
 
6.8 Overall Conclusion 
Our research has extended the frameworks by Gans-Stern (2003) and He et al. (2006) by 
incorporating the two kinds of de-alio entry behaviors. In Gans-Stern‟s (2003) framework, 
new entries are excluded when incumbents are strong in both intellectual property and 
complementary assets.  In He et al.‟s (2006) framework, they present the possible entry 
of de-alio firms by leveraging their existing complementary assets first. However, our 
study shows that the de-alio entry could be bidirectional. Some de-alio firms may enter 
by leveraging their existing complementary assets, while others mayfocus on developing 
intellectual property first. Although it is well known that complementary assets are 
important for de-alio entry, our study suggests that complementary assets are not 
sufficient for de-alio entry. We suggest that the entry behaviors differ depending on the 
different types of complementary assets: generic or specialized. We have obtained these 
conclusions through an in-depth case study of digital audio player industry. Although it is 
not yet able to generalize to other industries, our findings from this case would provide 
valuable insights for both academics to enrich the literature stream and for management 
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